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1. Introduction 
 
The debate about the possibility of entitling foreigners with local voting rights is 
periodically resurrected in European countries and cities. On the one hand, the exclusion 
of a growing share of their population from the right to participate in elections implies a 
contradiction for contemporary liberal democracies with potential effects on their own 
legitimacy. On the other hand, the partial betrayal of the principle ‘one person, one 
vote’ adds up to the debate about the responsibility of the receiving states in promoting 
the integration of their immigrants. In fact, the recognition of voting rights to foreigners 
can be conceived as a tool to facilitate integration rather than just as a reward to proved 
attachment and assimilation derived from the acquisition of the host nationality. The 
former has been the predominant view in countries like Sweden, Norway, Denmark or 
the Netherlands, which extended local voting rights to foreign residents in the 1970s 
and 1980s. However, in many other countries a very nationalistic view on this issue has 
prevailed, either widely opposing the signature of the Convention on the Participation of 
Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level (1992), or undergoing very controversial 
debates before approving its applicationi.  
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 As a result of this restrictive approach to granting local voting rights to non-EU 
foreigners in most European cities, the only empirical evidence we have on the electoral 
behaviour of persons of immigrant origin comes either from non-naturalised immigrants 
residing in the aforementioned North European countries, or from the subset of the 
population who have acquired the citizenship of their country of residence through 
naturalisation. The extent to which the voting behaviour of naturalised immigrants can 
be taken as representative of the behaviour of the immigrant population at large is 
difficult to assess. However, from a public policy perspective it seems important to 
know at least what are the main factors that impinge upon the inclination of this 
particular group (‘naturalised immigrants’) to turn out in the elections of the countries 
where they live.  
 
There are several reasons why we might expect high rates of participation among 
naturalised foreign-born citizens. First, naturalisation is a voluntary act that will often 
imply some important advantages for the person who decides to apply for it, one of 
which is precisely the possibility of having a say in the host country politics. Moreover, 
the naturalization process itself may serve as an opportunity to learn about the politics 
of the country and about democracy (Wong 2000). Immigrants that go through the 
naturalization process learn the practical, and normative, rules of the game when it 
comes to democracy (DeSippio 1996). In addition, most of the naturalised immigrants 
enter the political system at a moment in their lives when both their interest in politics 
and their stakes are high, compared to their descendants (Ramírez 2002). For all these 
reasons, naturalised immigrants should be expected to show higher participation rates 
than the comparable autochthonous population and their own descent. However, most of 
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the available studies in this field, which have mainly focused on the US experience, 
have found a lower – instead of a higher – turnout level among naturalised citizens, in 
comparison to that of their native counterparts. Within the European context, most of 
the scarce empirical evidence available comes from Scandinavian countries, where the 
aggregate rates of participation of naturalised citizens are still reported to be lower than 
that of the native-born citizens (Öhrvall 2006, cited in Bevelander and Pendakur 2008), 
although they have effectively been found to participate significantly more in local 
elections than their non-naturalised counterparts (Bäck and Soininen 1998; Togeby 
1999; Bevelander and Pendakur 2008). 
 
This consistent finding might be due to differences in the socio-economic profile of the 
naturalised group, a lack of assimilation, the particular effects that (ethnic) social capital 
may exert on the political engagement of immigrant individuals, or differences in the 
political opportunity structures that both immigrants and non-immigrants face in their 
cities. However, our knowledge on this issue still remains quite limited, especially in 
the European context, due to the difficulty to trace back the immigrant origin of voters 
in most of the available sources for the study of electoral behaviour. 
 
In this chapter we contribute to the debate on the voting behaviour of the population of 
immigrant origin by utilising the data collected by the Localmultidem survey in ten 
European Cities: Barcelona, Madrid, Geneva, Zurich, London, Lyon, Milan, Oslo, 
Stockholm and Budapest. We analyze the electoral participation of naturalised citizens 
in national elections, in comparison with that of the autochthonous population in their 
respective cities of residence. Our main goal is to isolate the effect of factors that have 
traditionally been found to explain the decision to vote in the general population from 
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those other factors that are immigrant-specific, both at the individual and contextual 
level. 
  
 
2. What makes naturalised voters different? 
 
Two main elements are thought to intervene in shaping the individuals’ voting decision:  
their interest in politics, and the cost-benefit structure of voting. But both elements vary 
with the individual’s resources. Early models of political participation already found a 
significant relationship between socio-economic variables and the propensity to vote 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980). Although education, income, and occupation are commonly utilised 
to test the resource model, also known as the socio-economic status (SES) approach, 
education is generally the best predictor of electoral participation among these three. 
 
In addition to these resources, age and marital status have been found to be also strong 
predictors of an individual’s likelihood of voting. Generally, the young are less prone to 
participate in elections, whereas married individuals are more likely to vote than singles. 
The argument behind the higher turnout of married people and, to some extent, of 
employed individuals is a network one: both employment and marriage are indirect 
indicators of the degree to which individuals are embedded in social networks, which 
are likely to foster participation to the extent that they reduce the costs of obtaining 
political information. In addition, in the case of spouses, the positive effect of marriage 
is hypothesized to come from potential ‘selective sanctions for noncompliance’ coming 
from peers (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).   
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 Many of the immigrants currently living in European democracies came to their 
countries of residence for economic opportunities. This fact indirectly implies that they 
typically have low SES or, at least, a lower SES than natives. Accordingly, they also are 
expected to have lower electoral participation levels. However, individuals of similar 
SES also reveal different attitudes towards politics due to differences in psychological 
characteristics and previous socialisation experiences. Not only the level of political 
interest varies between individuals of the same socio-economic group, but also the 
extent to which they believe that their participation matters (external efficacy) and that 
they understand politics (i.e. internal efficacy). In most cases, studies concerned with 
the political incorporation of people of immigrant origin have not paid attention to these 
political orientations due to the lack of data, on the one hand, and to the overwhelming 
dominance of the resources approach in previous analyses of electoral behaviour, on the 
other. However, some recent investigations have demonstrated the importance of 
political orientations in shaping the immigrants’ decision to naturalise (Pantoja and 
Allen 2006; Diehl and Blohm 2003). If the immigrants most interested in politics tend 
to be over-represented among the group of naturalised citizens, it seems essential to 
neutralise the effect of potential differences in political orientations across groups in 
order to explain correctly differences in the turnout of naturalised and non-naturalised 
voters. 
 
Moreover, migration is known to have an important disruptive effect in different fields 
of social and economic life, which is expected to vanish as the length of residence 
increases and the behavioural patterns of immigrants progressively converge 
(assimilate) with that of their comparable natives. In the case of political integration, the 
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evidence available so far indicates also a positive effect of years since migration on 
electoral participation (Uhlaner et al. 1989, Hill and Moreno 1996, Ramakrishnan and 
Espenshade 2001).  Some authors have even concluded that differences in turnout 
behaviour among naturalised immigrants from different national origins just reflect 
differences in length of stay across groups, or differences in their time of arrival (Bass 
and Casper 2001, Lafountain and Johson 2008).  However, we know that ‘years since 
migration’ is just a proxy for many other processes going on in the settlement process 
that we often cannot adequately measure. One of the main reasons why naturalised 
immigrants might vote less than autochthonous citizens is their language skills, which is 
a crucial resource for navigating the political system and obtaining the very basic 
information they need to participate. Apart from language skills, more subjective 
indicators of assimilation such as ‘perceptions of discrimination’ are also expected to 
affect immigrants’ propensity to vote and, at the same time, vary with length of 
residence. Previous studies in the US have confirmed that both language fluency 
(Johson, Stein & Wrinkle 2004), and the absence of feelings or experiences of 
discrimination (Schildkraut 2004) are generally associated with increases in the 
electoral participation of naturalised immigrants. 
 
In spite of the consistent evidence that suggests that assimilation affects turnout levels, 
important differences across ethnic and/or national groups who reside in the same 
country remains even after controlling for differences in their length of stay. These 
inter-group differences have sometimes been attributed to the long-lasting effect of 
different political cultures in their countries of origin. Other authors have emphasized 
the potential role that the aggregated characteristics of the migrant communities to 
which they belong may play in explaining different participation gaps across ethnic 
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groups. Particularly lively has been the debate around the effects that aggregate levels of 
(ethnic) social capital may have in accounting for the differences in turnout between 
ethnic groups since the publication of Fennema and Tillie’s (1999) original article on 
this matter. It appeared from their network analyses that the Turkish community in 
Amsterdam is the most civic, followed by the Moroccan community, the Surinamese 
and the Antillean. This rank order was the same as the rank order found for turnout at 
elections, which led the authors to conclude that ‘the more an ethnic group is engaged in 
the own community’s affairs, the more it participates in local politics’ (721).  
 
Despite the large empirical efforts conducted over the last years to test the different 
implications of the (ethnic) social capital hypothesis (Tillie and Fennema 2001, Tillie 
2004, Michon and Tillie 2003, Berger, Galonska and Koopmans 2004, Jacobs, Phalet 
and Swyngedouw 2005, Tillie 2004), the evidence still remains inconsistent and 
particularly scarce with regard to the potential effects of associational engagement on 
the electoral behaviour of migrants at the individual level (Togeby 1999). Formulated at 
the individual level, the theory is that participation in voluntary ethnic organisations 
builds social trust and tolerance, which in turn creates the basis for widespread political 
participation and trust in political institutions of the country of residence (see Anduiza 
and San Martín in this volume). If participation in ethnic organisations merely increases 
participation, but not trust, it is still possible that organisational participation enhances 
political mobilisation, but this mobilisation is not necessarily an asset for democracy. 
Therefore, it is important that participation in ethnic organisations leads not only to 
increased activity, but also to increased participation in the political institutions of the 
country of residence – for example, higher voter turnout (Togeby 2004). 
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Finally, the role of the institutional context and the structure of political opportunities, 
configured either at the national level (Ireland 1994, Soysal 1994, Koopmans and 
Statham 1999, Giugni and Passy 2004), or the local level (Bousetta 2000, Garbaye 
2002, Morales, González-Ferrer and Jorba 2009), is also thought to be fundamental in 
explaining immigrants’ political integration as a whole. Although one of the major 
weaknesses of the opportunity structure approach was, for a long time, the lack of 
specific measurements for such a multifaceted concept, some recent pieces of research 
have substantially improved the quality of their empirical test by gathering systematic 
information on a series of indicators for different dimensions of the opportunity 
structure (see Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy 2005, Giugni and Passy 2004, 
Koopmans 2004, Giugni and Passy 2003). They have all confirmed the importance of 
models of citizenship – both national and locally defined – in shaping patterns of 
collective mobilization and political claims-making by immigrants and ethnic minorities 
(see also Cinalli and Giugni in this volume). However, none of them has examined 
whether and how these models of citizenship affect the electoral participation of 
individuals of immigrant origin who are entitled with voting rights.  
 
In the particular case of naturalised immigrants, the rules regulating citizenship 
acquisition are expected to be one of the institutional factors that more strongly affect 
their electoral participation. However, in which direction that effect goes is not clear in 
advance since the main determinants of the naturalisation decision has not been yet 
clearly established in the literature (Johnson et al. 1999). One of the arguments more 
commonly utilised by the advocates of restricting the immigrants’ access to citizenship 
is that the tougher the naturalisation rules, the more selective the process, and thus the 
most similar new and old citizens will be. Applied to the field of political integration 
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and electoral behaviour, one may expect that the participation gap between naturalised 
immigrants and the autochthonous population will be smaller in those cities where the 
process to acquire citizenship assures that naturalised citizens know the language, the 
costumes, intend to stay permanently, and feel truly attached to their new country. And 
the other way around, the gap is expected to be larger in those contexts where the access 
to citizenship is not demanding enough. We will refer to this reasoning as the ‘selection 
hypothesis’. 
 
On the other hand, it seems also reasonable to expect that norms regulating the access of 
foreigners (and their relatives) to entry and residence permits will have an effect on the 
turnout of the naturalised (and foreigners, where they are granted local voting rights). 
Contexts that facilitate the acquisition and renewal of residence permits will promote 
‘more integrated’ immigrants to the extent that a stronger legal status reduces the 
probability of exploitation, discrimination, social exclusion, etc. Moreover, as some 
authors have pointed out, harsher conditions for family reunification, difficult access to 
legal employment and, in general, insecurity of residence status may operate as strong 
incentives for naturalisation (see Bauböck and Cinar 2001, on the recent Austrian 
example). Such an ‘escape into naturalisation’ is likely to weaken the potential link 
between naturalisation and the exercise of voting rights if the main reason to naturalise 
is (just) to avoid foreigners’ law. 
 
Finally, the particular setting in which the election takes place is likely to affect the 
turnout of different groups. In the case of voters of immigrant origin, Pantoja et al. 
(2001) have demonstrated that the degree of politicisation around immigration issues 
significantly affects the level of immigrants’ participation. There is also some evidence 
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of this in Dutch cities (van Helsuum et al. 2007). Accordingly, we expect an increase in 
turnout among the naturalised citizens if relatively strong anti-immigrant parties are 
present, while we have no clear theoretical argument to expect either a positive or a 
negative effect on autochthonous voters. 
 
 
3. Data, samples and main descriptives of the dependent variable 
 
Data and samples 
 
Persons to whom the citizenship of a state is not ascribed at birth may be able to acquire 
it later in life through naturalization. Accordingly, we classify an individual in the 
Localmultidem dataset as a naturalised respondent if she acquired the citizenship of the 
country of residence after birth. We must emphasise that our samples were not designed 
to be representative of the naturalised population residing in each city, but only of the 
population of specific groups of immigrant origin. However, the proportion of 
naturalised respondents in our city samples are quite close to the proportion estimated 
by other sources, which make us more confident about the reliability of our resultsii. On 
the other hand, it is important to highlight that some of these individuals we call 
‘naturalised’ can be ‘second generation immigrants’ since they are children of 
immigrants who were born as foreigners in their parents’ country of immigration but 
acquired the citizenship of their country of residence (and birth) later on. In our data, 
these individuals represented approximately 10 percent of the total sub-sample of 
naturalised citizensiii. We have run all the models with and without this group, and 
results hardly change.  
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 The size of the naturalised group in a particular city or country depends on the rules 
governing the access to the host country’s nationality, the length of stay of the 
immigrant population and their propensity to naturalise. Cross-cities differences 
reported in Table 1 largely reflect variation along these three dimensions. As shown, 25 
percent of the total naturalised population concentrates in Oslo and 17 percent in 
Stockholm, while the rest of the naturalised group is more or less evenly distributed 
across cities, with the only exception of Milan, where the presence of naturalised 
citizens is negligible. 
 
----- Table 1 here------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
The dependent variable 
 
In this chapter we will analyse turnout in national elections, and we are primarily 
interested in the differences between naturalised individuals and the autochthonous 
population.iv The question used to create our dependent variable (‘voted in the last 
national elections in the country of residence’) was the following: ‘Sometimes people 
don’t vote because they cannot or because they don’t want to. Did you vote in the last 
[name of host country parliament] elections, or was there anything that made you 
unable or unwilling to vote?’.  
 
If the respondent answered negatively, the interviewers were instructed to ask them 
whether they were eligible to vote or not. Approximately 13 percent of the 1,990 
naturalised individuals included in our analyses responded that they were not eligible to 
 11
vote at the time of the latest national elections.v Additionally, 2.5 percent said they did 
not remember whether they voted or not, and 0.5 percent refused to answer this 
question. In the case of the autochthonous population, 2.4 percent were not eligible, 2 
percent could not remember and 1.1 percent refused. Therefore, we calculated the 
turnout percentages with a final sample of 1674 naturalised individuals and 3109 
autochthonous.  
 
As shown in Table 2, on average, individuals who acquired the nationality of their host 
country by naturalisation participate approximately 20 percent less than the 
autochthonous population of their respective city in the last national elections (see the 
turnout ratio in last row). However, there are large cross-city variations in this regard. 
Zurich presents the largest gap in turnout levels, but no gap is observed in Lyon, and it 
is even reversed in the case of London. In between, we observe cities with relatively 
large participation gaps such as Barcelona, Madrid, Milan or Oslo, and cities with 
relatively small gaps like Budapest, Geneva and Stockholm. 
 
------------ Table 2 here ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Some of these differences across cities are due to differences in the turnout propensity 
of different ethnic groups, which are unevenly represented in the cities we study (see 
Figure 4.1). For instance, naturalised citizens of Kosovar and Ecuadorian origin have 
turnout levels below 50 percent, and they are only present in Swiss cities and South 
European cities, respectively. However, ‘pure’ city-effects also seem to exist as 
individuals of the same ethnic origin living in different cities reveal substantial 
differences in turnout. In Figure 4.1, this fact is clearly illustrated by the case of the 
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Turks, who participate much more in Scandinavian cities than their counterparts in 
Zurich, or of the Moroccans that participate much more in Lyon than in the Spanish 
cities. 
 
--------- Figure 4.1. here ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Finally, we cannot discard the possibility that migrant communities have different 
characteristics across cities with regard to their SES, migration background, religious 
practice, political attitudes, etc., which could account for – at least part of – the turnout 
gap between naturalised citizens and the autochthonous population. In fact, in our 
sample, naturalised individuals are, on average, younger and less educated than the 
majority population, and are also married and employed more frequently than their 
native counterparts. Furthermore, the presence of atheist/agnostic respondents is more 
common among the autochthonous population (23 percent) than among the naturalised 
group (10 percent), and the proportion of Muslims is virtually zero in the majority 
population while it represents almost half of the naturalised individuals. With regard to 
their political attitudes, naturalised immigrants lag behind the autochthonous population 
in their level of political interest and associational engagement, although differences are 
relatively smallvi. 
 
All in all, it is clear that we should consider all these concurrent dimensions (group-
effects, city-effects and individual-effects) simultaneously in order to provide a 
complete account of the turnout gap observed between naturalised citizens and the 
majority population in our ten cities. Unfortunately, limitations in the number of cases 
and the selection of immigrant groups across cities prevent us from such an ideal 
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analysis because few groups are present in several locations. Alternatively, we have 
decided to run two different types of multivariate analysis. First, we focused on the 
largest ethnic or regional ethnic groups surveyed in several cities (Turks, Maghrebians 
and Andeans) and analyse the main determinants of their electoral behaviour by 
utilising logistic regressions to assess the size and characteristics of the potential 
differences across groups. Secondly, we run a second set of analyses in which we pool 
the information for all naturalised citizens (regardless of their ethnic/national origin) 
and examine the observed differences in their electoral behaviour in comparison to that 
of the autochthonous population in their cities of residence, utilising multilevel logistic 
regressions. This second analysis allows us to analyse the role of the political 
opportunity structures in shaping the voting behaviour of naturalised citizens across 
European cities. 
 
 
4. Analyses and Results  
 
4.1. The electoral participation of naturalised individuals with a focus on cross-ethnic 
group differences  
 
In order to exploit as much as possible the information in the Localmultidem dataset, in 
this section our aim is to compare the main factors explaining the gap in the turnout of 
naturalised citizens of different ethnic origins, regardless of the city where they live. To 
do this, we focus on the three largest groups we are able to reconstruct from our 
samples: Turks, Maghrebians (including Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians), and 
Andeans (including Ecuadorians, Colombians, Bolivians and Peruvians).vii  
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 ----- Table 3 here ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Results in Table 3 show both remarkable similarities across these three groups. First, 
after controlling for differences in SES, migration trajectory, religion, political attitudes 
and organisational involvementviii, a significant gap in participation between the 
naturalised and autochthonous respondents only exists for Turks and Andeans but not 
for Maghrebians. In fact, a significant gap between the Maghrebians and autochthonous 
French remained until we added the control ‘Muslim’ to the model, which took away 
the large differences in voting behaviour between the two groups (not shown here). This 
is surely an interesting result that deserves further investigation, given that religion does 
not play such a crucial role in explaining the turnout differences among Turks and the 
autochthonous population in their respective cities. In addition, the assimilation model 
is only partially supported by these results. Although longer stays generally reduce the 
turnout gap, the result is not significant for Maghrebians. Besides, language fluency 
only appears to be relevant in explaining the participation gap of the Turks but not the 
rest of our groups, although interpretation of this effect is again problematic, because it 
is only relevant for the Moroccans in the Spanish cities (but not in the French ones) and 
for the Ecuadorians in Milan; and finally, perceptions of discrimination played no role. 
With regard to the resource model, results are also mixed. Neither gender nor 
employment displayed significant effects for any group, and education revealed the 
expected positive and significant effect for both Andeans and Maghrebians. However, 
one of the most surprising results in these analyses is the effect of education within the 
Turkish community: apparently, the least educated Turks (if we run the model including 
just naturalised individuals and exclude the autochthonous voters) are the ones who 
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participate more. Surely, this result requires additional research. Finally, both 
organisational involvement and interest in politics show consistent positive and 
significant effects across the three groups. 
 
Bearing all this in mind, it is unavoidable to wonder if part of these results derive from 
true differences across these three ethnic groups or rather from differences between their 
respective autochthonous in each city, or even from their cities’ characteristics. In order 
to explore this issue a bit further, for the sample of naturalised citizens of Turkish origin 
– which is the largest and most homogenous one in terms of ethnic composition in our 
dataset – we have estimated one additional model that includes city-effects (see last 
column in Table 3). Differences across cities, even if we restrict the analyses to the 
same ethnic group, remain large and significant; in the case of the Turks, the differences 
between naturalised Turks across cities is even more important than differences with 
their respective autochthonous population. To illustrate the actual effect of all these 
differences, in Table 4 we summarize (as per the estimates in Model 2 of Table 3) the 
predicted probabilities of voting in host national elections of a male naturalised 
immigrant of Turkish origin, with lower secondary education, with partner, employed, 
who has resided for 15 years in the city, with little interest in the host country politics, 
fluent in the host language, not involved in any kind of association and who has not felt 
discriminated against because of his origin. 
 
-----------------Table 4 here ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
On average, differences in turnout probabilities of naturalised Turks with the described 
characteristics in different cities remain larger than differences between them and their 
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native counterparts in their respective cities (compare ratios in last row and last column 
in Table 4). These findings clearly claim for paying more attention to the potential role 
of different political opportunity structures in shaping immigrants’ behaviours as we do 
in the next section. 
 
4.2. The electoral participation of naturalised individuals with a focus on cross-city 
differences  
 
The dataset will be analysed using multilevel logistic regression with cities at level 2. 
Multilevel analysis is used for one main reason: our sample is drawn from ten cities 
and it is quite likely that there is an unmeasured effect of the context (i.e. cities) 
resulting in intra-class correlation, which has to be controlled for.ix In this chapter, 
we will pay particular attention to the city characteristics related to specific aspects of 
the political opportunity structure at the city level that are likely to influence the 
voting behaviour of naturalised citizens. 
 
Six logistic regression models with the dependent variable ‘voted in the last national 
elections in the country of residence’ are presented (Table 5). Model 0 gives the null 
model with a random intercept for cities, and serves as a reference point in the 
evolution of cross-city variance. In Model 1 the immigrant-specific characteristics 
(whether the person is a naturalised citizen, her length of residence, whether she is 
fluent in the host country language, and whether she had felt discriminated against 
because of her ethnicity in the last 12 months), along with the individual’s religion 
(Protestant, Muslim and others) are included. In Model 2, we test the strength of the 
resources model and the importance of political attitudes to account for participation 
 17
differences between naturalised citizens and the autochthonous population, by adding 
individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, employment partnership 
status, and interest in host politics to the previous specification. In Model 3, 
indicators controlling for the organisational involvement of the individual in either 
ethnic or non-ethnic organisations are added. And finally, Model 4 includes three 
selected indicators measuring those dimensions of the political opportunity structure 
more likely to affect the turnout of naturalised citizens: the openness/closure of the 
citizenship acquisition regime, the openness/closure of the residence permits regime, 
and the electoral support received by anti-immigrant parties in the last national 
elections in each particular city. 
 
Model 1 confirms that naturalised citizens vote less than their autochthonous 
counterparts. However, we must admit that the participation gap suggested by the 
coefficient of the variable ‘Naturalised’ (-1.83) is a little unrealistic since it measures 
the effect of being a naturalised individual who has resided zero years in the host 
country, (i.e. years since migration = 0), which is a virtually impossible situation. The 
positive sign of the coefficient of ‘years since migration’ indicates that there is some 
convergence with natives’ turnout levels over time, although at a quite slow pace since a 
naturalised male Muslim who is fluent in the host language, has reported no 
discrimination and has lower secondary education would require more than 30 years of 
residence to reach the participation level of a comparable native in his city of residence. 
Note that thirty years of residence to achieve the autochthonous’ turnout level is a long 
time,  especially if one takes into account that the naturalised are a self-selected group 
within the immigrant population for which participation is expected to be easier and, 
therefore, more likely.x
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 On the other hand, neither language fluency nor feelings of discrimination revealed a 
significant effect in explaining the participation gap among them and the autochthonous 
voters. These results are a little bit unexpected and contrary to previous evidence, 
especially the one referred to the non-significant effect (and negative sign) of language 
skills, which does not change even if we drop the cities in which most immigrants have 
the same language as natives (i.e. Madrid and Barcelona). Moreover, if we restrict the 
sample to the naturalised group (i.e. excluding natives), the sign of the coefficient 
reverses (as expected), but it remains non-significant.xi On the contrary, the effect of 
‘having felt discriminated against’ becomes negative and significant if we restrict our 
sample to only naturalised immigrants, in line with previous findings in the literature. In 
other words, discrimination feelings affect the participation probabilities of the 
naturalised citizens in our sample but they have no significant effect in explaining the 
participation gap between immigrants and the autochthonous population. 
 
Finally, we include religion as an immigrant-specific variable because most Muslim 
individuals in our sample are immigrants. As can be seen, different faiths are associated 
with a different voting propensity: while Protestants are more likely to vote in national 
elections, Muslims are significantly less likely to participate than people from other 
faiths (including non-believers). However, we need to control for additional variables 
before interpreting this result. 
 
Model 2 confirms the importance of individual resources and political attitudes in 
explaining part of the observed differences in the level of electoral participation 
between the autochthonous population and individuals of immigrant origin.  However, 
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as expected, the classical resource model is insufficient to account for the large political 
gap between these groups since the effect of being a naturalised citizen remains 
negative and significant (see the coefficient for ‘Naturalised’ in Models 1 and 2) even 
after neutralising the impact of differences in gender, age, education, employment and 
partnership status.xii On the other hand, controlling for socio-economic differences 
between the two groups eliminates the effect of religion on voting propensity, which is 
an important result to highlight. 
 
In model 3 we added a set of dichotomous variables measuring differences in the 
individuals’ interest in host country politics. As expected, individuals who reported to 
be very interested in politics are much more likely to vote than those who are fairly, 
little or not at all interested (differences between the four categories are significant); in 
addition, this is the case for both the naturalised and the autochthonous population if we 
run separate regressions for each group. Despite the large effect of politics interest in 
predicting voting behaviour, the large negative effect of being naturalised remains, 
which confirms that differences in the political interest for these two groups are not the 
main reason underlying the participation gap. 
 
-------------- Table 5 here -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In model 4, we test the social capital hypothesis at the individual level. According to our 
results, associational engagement in general (i.e. in any kind of association) exerts a 
positive effect on electoral participation, in line with our expectations. However, 
participation in ‘ethnic advocacy organisations’ in particular does not make a significant 
difference with regard to the gap in voting behaviour between naturalised citizens and 
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autochthonous population in national elections. In addition, it is important to highlight 
that these effects remain unchanged if we restricted the sample to naturalised 
immigrants. 
 
Once we have examined the explanatory value of the assimilation model, the resources’ 
approach and the social capital hypotheses in accounting for the voting gaps between 
naturalised immigrants and the autochthonous population, we turn our attention to the 
role that different political opportunity structures may play in shaping the voting 
behaviour of naturalised individuals. One of the main objectives of this chapter consists 
in examining the empirical support for the ‘selection’ and the ‘escape into’ 
naturalisation hypotheses, as we formulated in section 2. If tough naturalisation rules 
truly secure that naturalised immigrants will be the most integrated ones (i.e. the most 
similar ones to their autochthonous counterparts), the voting gap between the 
autochthonous and naturalised migrants should be lower the tougher the naturalisation 
regime is.  
 
In Figure 4.2 we have represented this relationship according to the information in our 
samplexiii. The index for ‘openness of the nationality acquisition rules’ was calculated 
on the basis of seven different indicators measured for each national (ethnic) group in 
each city.xiv The participation gap is measured here as the turnout ratio between 
naturalized immigrants and their autochthonous counterparts. Thus, a turnout ratio equal 
to 1 indicates no gap in electoral participation between the naturalized and the 
autochthonous population, a ratio larger than 1 indicates that the naturalized group 
participates in elections more than the autochthonous population, and a ratio smaller 
than 1 indicates that naturalized people vote less than autochthonous citizens. The 
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results lead to conclude that the relationship is in the opposite direction to that expected 
by the ‘selection’ hypothesis according to which the turnout ratio should be closer to 1 
as the citizenship acquisition regime becomes tougher (more negative in our indicator), 
and in any case quite weakxv. 
 
------ Figure 4.2. here ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In Figure 4.3 we have also examined the hypothesis of ‘escape into naturalisation’. 
According to this hypothesis, the tougher the legal regime to grant foreigners (and their 
relatives) entry and residence permits, the greater their incentive to apply for 
naturalisation regardless of political interest and, therefore, the weaker the expected 
relationship between naturalisation and vote in host country elections. In this case, to 
calculate the openness of the residence regime we employed fifteen different indicators 
for each group-city combination.xvi
 
------ Figure 4.3. here ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In this occasion, the relationship goes in the expected direction and seems clearer and 
stronger than before: naturalised immigrants that face greater difficulties to strength 
gain legal status in their cities of residence (left side of the figure) show lower turnout 
ratios (i.e. larger gaps in participation with their autochthonous counterparts), than those 
who reside in contexts where the access to a stable legal status is easier to achieve (right 
side of the picture) for whom we observe turnout ratios closer to 1. 
 
In order to confirm whether the preliminary evidence shown in these figures is 
confirmed in our multivariate analysis, we added the two aforementioned variables –
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openness of the rules for acquisition of the host country’s nationality, and openness of 
the residence permits’ regime – to the initial specification of the model. Note that the 
potential effect of these two variables only makes sense for naturalised immigrants, not 
for natives; accordingly, we have interacted them with the variable ‘naturalised’ in 
model 5. In addition, in the same model, we have also added an indicator for the 
electoral strength of anti-immigrant parties in last national elections at the city level.  
 
Our results in Model 5 confirm, first of all, that a sizable part of the variance in the size 
of the participation gap across cities is due to differences in these institutional 
characteristics (see the reduction in the size of the standard deviation of the random 
intercepts from Model 4 to 5). In addition, results show that naturalised immigrants that 
live in contexts where the legislation permits foreigners a stable legal status, immigrants 
who decide to naturalise are more likely to participate in the host country elections than 
in those contexts where naturalisation becomes almost the only way to secure residence 
(and other) rights. In contrast, tougher naturalisation regimes are not able to ensure that 
new citizens will be strongly engaged with the host country politics, as indicated by the 
non-significant effect of the variable ‘citizenship regime’. Thus, the ‘selection 
hypothesis’ does not seem to be at work with regard to the electoral participation of the 
naturalised citizens. In sum, from our results we can deduce that legal systems that offer 
foreigners easier ways of securing their legal status in the host country tend to promote 
a more participatory behaviour of the naturalised immigrants in the elections.  
 
Finally, the presence of relatively strong anti-immigrant/radical-right parties does not 
seem to trigger turnout for either naturalised immigrants or the autochthonous group. 
We also tried an interaction effect, in order to allow for possible opposite effects of this 
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variable between naturalised and autochthonous voters, but no significant effect 
emerged, so we decided to keep the model as simple as possible. 
 
In Figure 4.4 we have represented the change in the probability of voting as the rules 
governing the granting and renewal of residence permits becomes softer for a 
naturalised immigrant who is a 40 years-old male Muslim, with upper secondary school, 
married, fairly interested in politics, member of a voluntary association, fluent in the 
host language, who arrived to the country sixteen years ago, who has not reported 
experiences of discrimination because of his origin in the last 12 months, and who lives 
in a city where anti-immigrant parties are not particularly strong and where the norms 
regulating the access to citizenship are neither too tough nor too soft. As we see, the 
increasing openness of the immigration regime in terms of residence status substantially 
increases the probability of naturalised immigrants to participate and, therefore, to 
reduce their gap with the comparable autochthonous population. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Our results have confirmed that naturalised immigrants participate systematically less 
than comparable autochthonous citizens in national elections of their host country in 
virtually all the cities included in our study, even after neutralising the effect of 
differences in the socio-demographic characteristics, political orientations, immigration 
experience, social capital, religiosity and the institutional context affecting these two 
groups. Although there is some evidence of assimilation in the electoral participation of 
naturalised citizens as their length of residence extends, it seems to proceed at a very 
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slow pace. However, it seems important to highlight that independently of the 
characteristics of the naturalised population, there seems to be large room for legislators 
and policy-makers to promote the electoral participation of naturalised citizens by 
offering them credible possibilities of having a secure residency status since their arrival 
to the country. This policy choice is likely to promote and enhance ‘true integration’ of 
immigrants into the host politics and society, not only after naturalisation but from the 
very beginning of the foreigner’s arrival to the new country. In addition, this same result 
casts some doubts on the convenience of relaxing the requirements to citizenship 
acquisition as a palliative for the lack of political rights of the immigrant population. In 
fact, our results found no evidence of any significant connection between the turnout of 
naturalised and the openness of the citizenship acquisition regime. 
 
Finally, it seems clear that further research on this issue should improve our insights. 
Future work should examine group-specific effects (including both characteristics of the 
countries of origin of the individuals, and characteristics of the immigrant communities 
at destination), as well as other institutional characteristics of the cities of residence, 
such as the type of electoral system or the mobilisation context, which were neglected in 
our analyses. 
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Table 4.1. Sample size by city of residence (row percentages) 
 BAR BUD GEN LON LYO MAD MIL OSL STO ZUR Total 
Naturalised 7.2 6.3 9.4 10.2 8.5 6.8 2.1 25.4 17.2 6.8 100.0 
 (144) (126) (187) (202) (170) (136) (42) (505) (342) (136) (1,990) 
            
Autochthonous 9.2 18.3 7.3 9.0 11.3 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.9 7.5 100.0 
 (302) (600) (240) (297) (371) (306) (301) (300) (324) (247) (3,288) 
            
Total 8.5 13.8 8.1 9.5 10.3 8.4 6.5 15.3 12.6 7.3 100.0 
 (446) (726) (427) (499) (541) (442) (343) (805) (666) (383) (5,278) 
Note: Number of observations in brackets 
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Table 4.2. Turnout of naturalised and autochthonous population in last national elections, by city of 
residence (percentages) 
 BAR BUD GEN LON LYO MAD MIL OSL STO ZUR Total 
Autochthonous 82.5 80.6 73.4 50.0 65.8 87.2 93.1 96.3 94.1 69.9 79.9 
Naturalised 55.6 69.9 65.3 52.9 62.9 59.3 69.4 66.2 86.8 32.8 64.9 
            
Turnout 
Differential  
Nat-Aut. 
-27.0 -10.7 -8.1 2.9 -2.9 -27.9 -23.7 -30.1 -7.3 -37.1 -15.0 
Turnout Ratio 
Nat./Aut. 
0.7 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.8 
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Table 4.3. Logit estimates of the probability of voting in national elections of the country of 
residence 
 Maghrebians Andeans Turks 
   Model 1 Model 2 
Naturalised (ref. autocht.) 
-0.04 
(0.54) 
-3.46** 
(0.56) 
-1.44** 
(0.67) 
-2.37** 
(.85) 
Years since migration 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.10** 
(0.03) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(.02) 
Fluent (ref. no) 
-0.09 
(0.47) 
-0.97 
(2.22) 
0.78** 
(0.37) 
0.12 
(.41) 
Discriminated (ref. no) 
0.39 
(0.32) 
-0.27 
(0.53) 
-0.24 
(0.40) 
-0.78 
(.50) 
Age 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(.01) 
Female (ref. male) 
-0.15 
(0.16) 
0.22 
(0.21) 
0.23 
(0.18) 
0.20 
(.19) 
(ref. primary and less)     
Lower secondary 
0.43* 
(0.25) 
0.40 
(0.32) 
-1.17** 
(0.35) 
-0.71 
(.37) 
Upper secondary 
0.96** 
(0.28) 
0.78** 
(0.33) 
-0.87** 
(0.32) 
-0.49 
(.34) 
Tertiary 
0.57** 
(0.27) 
0.75** 
(0.36) 
-0.11 
(0.36) 
-0.01 
(.39) 
Employed (ref. no) 
0.21 
(0.17) 
-0.27 
(0.24) 
-0.35 
(0.19) 
0.27 
(.25) 
With partner (ref. no) 
0.34** 
(0.16) 
-0.08 
(0.20) 
0.90** 
(0.19) 
0.67** 
(.21) 
(ref. not at all)     
Very interested in host politics 
1.39** 
(0.28) 
2.12** 
(0.42) 
1.75** 
(0.35) 
1.73** 
(.31) 
Fairly interested… 
0.90** 
(0.24) 
1.45** 
(0.28) 
1.41** 
(0.28) 
0.79** 
(.31) 
Little interested… 
0.54** 
(0.24) 
0.65** 
(0.26) 
0.71** 
(0.29) 
0.51** 
(.23) 
Involved in organisation (ref. no) 
0.18 
(0.16) 
0.46** 
(0.21) 
0.92** 
(0.21) 
0.51** 
(.23) 
Involved in ethnic advocacy organisation (ref. no) n.e. n.e. 
0.10 
(0.47) 
0.05 
(.51) 
Muslim, or Protestant for Andean (ref. other) 
-0.77* 
(0.41) 
0.10 
(0.66) 
-0.52 
(0.36) 
-0.42 
(.42) 
Oslo    
2.35** 
(.41) 
Stockholm    
2.04** 
(.31) 
Naturalised Turk* Oslo    
0.25** 
(.62) 
Naturalised Turk* Stockholm    
1.10** 
(.62) 
Constant 
-2.59** 
(0.63) 
-0.15 
(2.25) 
-1.86** 
(0.62) 
-2.95** 
(.68) 
Pseudos-R2 0.1514 0.1976 0.2139 0.3104 
N 1100 980 1188 1188 
Legend: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05. Standard errors in brackets. N.e.= not estimated due to insufficient cases. 
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Table 4.4. Predicted probabilities of voting for naturalised citizens of Turkish origin and 
autochthonous population in Oslo, Stockholm and Zurich 
 
Naturalised of Turkish 
origin Authocht. 
Ratio 
Naturalised-
Autocht. 
Oslo    
Pr(y=1): 0.54 [0.31, 0.77] 
0.82 
[0.63, 1.02] 
0.65 
Pr(y=0): 0.46 [0.23, 0.69] 
0.18 
[0.00, 0.37] 
 
Stockholm    
Pr(y=1): 0.69 [0.45, 0.93] 
0.77 
[0.57, 0.98] 
0.90 
Pr(y=0): 0.31 [0.07, 0.55] 
0.23 
[0.02, 0.43] 
 
Zurich    
Pr(y=1): 0.09 [0.00, 0.18] 
0.31 
[0.07, 0.55] 
0.29 
Pr(y=0): 0.91 [0.82, 1.00] 
0.69 
[0.45, 0.93] 
 
Ratio Naturalised Oslo-
Stockh. 1.17  
 
Ratio Naturalised Oslo-
Zurich 6.0  
 
Ratio Naturalised 
Stockh.-Zurich -7.6  
 
Note: 95% Confidence Intervals in brackets 
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Table 4.5. Logit coefficients of participating in national elections versus not (coefficients and 
standard errors) 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Immigration-Specific 
Naturalised (ref. 
autocht.)  
-1.92** 
(0.17) 
-1.55** 
(0.18) 
-1.59** 
(0.19) 
-1.53** 
(0.19) 
-1.53** 
(0.19) 
Years since Migration  
0.05** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Fluent (ref. no)  
-0.15 
(0.16) 
-0.03 
(0.17) 
-0.22 
(0.18) 
-0.22 
(0.18) 
-0.29 
(0.18) 
Perception of 
discrimination (ref. no)  
-0.02 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.00 
(0.15) 
-0.05 
(0.15) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
Protestant (ref. other 
non-Muslim)  
0.31** 
(0.11) 
0.20 
(0.12) 
0.14 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.13) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
Muslim (ref. other non-
Protestant)  
-0.42** 
(0.12) 
-0.21 
(0.13) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.18 
(0.14) 
Socio-economic  
Female (ref. male)   
-0.05 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
Age   
0.03** 
(0.00) 
0.03** 
(0.00) 
0.03** 
(0.00) 
0.03** 
(0.00) 
(ref. less than lower sec.)       
Lower Secondary   
0.19 
(0.14) 
0.13 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
0.12 
(0.14) 
Upper Secondary   
0.63** 
(0.13) 
0.49** 
(0.13) 
0.45** 
(0.13) 
0.46** 
(0.13) 
Tertiary   
0.91** 
(0.13) 
0.62** 
(0.14) 
0.54** 
(0.14) 
0.56** 
(0.14) 
Employed (ref. no)   
0.22** 
(0.09) 
0.26** 
(0.09) 
0.25** 
(0.09) 
0.24** 
(0.09) 
In Partnership (ref. no)   
0.37** 
(0.08) 
0.38** 
(0.08) 
0.37** 
(0.08) 
0.38** 
(0.08) 
Political attitudes 
(ref. not at all)       
Very interested in host 
politics    
1.60** 
(0.14) 
1.52** 
(0.14) 
1.52** 
(0.14) 
Fairly interested    
1.06** 
(0.12) 
1.00** 
(0.12) 
1.03** 
(0.12) 
Little interested    
0.44** 
(0.12) 
0.40** 
(0.12) 
0.43** 
(0.12) 
Social Capital 
Involved in association 
(ref. no)     
0.41** 
(0.09) 
0.41** 
(0.09) 
Involved in ethnic 
advocacy association 
(ref. no) 
    0.15 (0.35) 
0.18 
(0.36) 
Political Opportunity Structure 
Citizenship 
Regime*Naturalised      
-0.06 
(0.21) 
Residence 
Rights*Naturalised      
0.79** 
(0.27) 
Anti-immig. 
Parties*Naturalised      
0.27 
(0.27) 
Constant 
1.15** 
(0.23) 
1.57** 
(0.30) 
-0.92** 
(0.35) 
-1.36** 
(0.37) 
-1.46** 
(0.37) 
-1.48** 
(0.36) 
       
St. Dev. Random 
Intercepts 
0.70** 
(0.16) 
0.76** 
(0.17) 
0.76** 
(0.17) 
0.81** 
(0.19) 
0.79** 
(0.18) 
0.70** 
(0.16) 
       
 37
Log-lik. -2434 -2307 -2183 -2101 -2090 -2086 
N 4614 4614 4614 4614 4614 4614 
Legend: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05. Standard errors in brackets 
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Figure 4.1. Turnout level by city of residence and ethnic group 
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Note: bars around the symbol represent the 95% confidence interval for each average turnout. 
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Figure 4.2. Relationship between the openness of the naturalization rules and the participation gap 
between the naturalised immigrants and the autochthonous population 
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Figure 4.3. Relationship between regulating residence permits and the participation gap between 
the naturalised immigrants and the autochthonous population  
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Figure 4.4.  Change in the probability of voting of a naturalised citizen of Turkish origin as the 
rules regulating residence rights become more open 
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* I am grateful to Ed Fieldhouse, Marc Swyngedouw, Katia Pilati, Laura Morales and José Fernández-
Albertos for helpful suggestions to previous versions of this chapter. All mistakes are mine. 
i For an illustration of this see the description of the Belgian case where the modification of the electoral 
law in 2004 was preceded by ‘a rather nasty political struggle, which brought the federal government very 
close to a crisis’  (Jacobs 2007). 
ii According to the Spanish National Immigrant Survey 2007, in the provinces of Madrid and Barcelona 
the percentage of naturalised people born in Morocco, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru - the five 
groups sampled in the Spanish Localmultidem Survey- is 17 percent. The corresponding percentage in the 
municipalities of Madrid and Barcelona is 17.4 according to the Localmultidem dataset. 
iii 24 percent of these individuals resided in Geneva, 19 percent in Lyon, 17 percent in Stockholm and 16 
in Zurich. 
iv Results for local elections were also analysed and showed the same pattern. 
v Most of these individuals were Latin-Americans living in Madrid and Barcelona, or Bosnians living in 
Oslo, who had acquired their host country’s nationality before we took the survey but after the last 
national elections in their countries of residence. 
vi Sample descriptives for each of the explanatory variables not shown here. 
vii We are aware that collapsing Ecuadorians, Colombians, Peruvians and Bolivians into a single regional 
ethnic group (Andeans) is problematic, especially because Ecuadorians and rest of Andeans have 
differing behaviours in some regards. This also happens, to a lesser extent, for Moroccans and Tunisians 
in Lyon. Obviously, the most homogenous of these three are the Turks, although some important 
differences might also emerge between Kurds and non-Kurds. For these reasons, we focus our comments 
and conclusions from these analyses on the Turks. However, we considered necessary to provide the 
reader with some examples of differences across cities for relatively ‘equivalent’ groups. 
viii Note that the effect of the variable ‘involved in ethnic advocacy organisation’ could not be estimated 
for Maghrebians and Andeans; Stata software automatically expelled the small number of cases with 
positive values in this variable because of ‘perfectly predicted outcomes’. 
ix The multilevel analyses were run with Stata, which provides full maximum likelihood for random 
intercept logistic regression models. The estimated parameters indicate whether there is a difference 
between respondents in the probability to vote and whether there is any difference across cities in the 
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extent to which people vote. If there is residual variance between contexts it can be further analysed 
whether this is the effect of specific characteristics of the cities. 
x It would be desirable to estimate the number of years needed to converge with the autochthonous 
turnout level after naturalization, instead of ‘since arrival’. However, one important limitation in our data 
is the lack of information about the exact moment when each individual naturalised. 
xi This might be related to the limited variability in fluency level in our sample, which is the combined 
result of the relatively large length of residence required to apply for citizenship in most of the cities in 
the survey, and the additional time that people often take to apply and being granted with the host country 
citizenship. 
xii If we run separate regressions for the naturalised and autochthonous groups the following differences 
emerge. First, more education is associated with higher voting probabilities only for the autochthonous 
but not for immigrants. Secondly, employment is only positively associated with participation for 
naturalised migrants but not for the autochthonous. Third, to be married or cohabitating increases the 
probability of voting only for the autochthonous population. Both results are consistent with the different 
meaning that these variables entail for each group as potential indicators of their ability to get information 
through their participation in social networks either at the work place or at home (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980). As partners of the naturalised immigrants are mostly of immigrant origin as well, the 
‘selective sanctions for noncompliance’ coming from peers (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993) are not such in 
this case. In contrast, the workplace might be a much more valuable environment to obtain information 
about local politics for people of foreign origin than for the autochthonous, as long as they are not 
segregated into ethnic niches. 
xiii The number of observations in the figure equals the number of city-ethnic group combinations in our 
sample, since different groups usually have different participation levels, and sometimes they are also 
subjected to different rules for citizenship acquisition even if they live in the same city or country. 
xiv The seven indicators were: 1) Ius solis for 2nd /3rd generations, 2) Conditions for acquiring the 
nationality through marriage with a national, 3) Length of residence required to acquire the nationality by 
naturalisation, 4) Existence of a requirement of minimum economic resources to obtain the nationality, 5) 
the percentage of approved applications for naturalisation in 2005, 6) reasons for nationality withdrawal, 
and 7) existence of cultural requirements (language test and others) for the nationality acquisition. Each 
of these indicators was coded -1, 0 or 1 and the final index was calculated by adding up the score of these 
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seven indicators and dividing it by seven. See Cinalli and Giugni (this volume) for more details on the 
indicators. 
xv The result does not change if we eliminate city-group combinations with less than 30 observations in 
our sample (BUD-CHI for Chinese people in Budapest, MIL-FIL and MIL-ECU for Pilipino and 
Ecuadorian people in Milan). Even if we eliminate the entire city of Zurich and Indians in London (LON-
IND), the overall result remains unchanged. 
xvi For short-term permit, four indicators were considered: 1) automatic acquisition of the permit if mother 
or father of a national minor child, 2) automatic acquisition of the permit if marriage with a national, 3) 
link between work regime and permit regime, 4) grounds for withdrawal. For long-term permits: 1) 
automatic acquisition of the permit if mother or father of a national minor child, 2) automatic acquisition 
of the permit if marriage with a national, 3) required minimum time of habitual residence, 4) economic 
resources requirement, 5) percentage of given long-term permits over the total number of applications at 
national level, 6) grounds for withdrawal, 7) expulsion precluded. And finally, for permits on the basis of 
family reunification: 1) eligibility for legal residents, 2) economic resources requirement, 3) duration of 
validity of permit, 4) grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status and, 5) right to 
autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority. 
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